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I. INTRODUCTION
Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, it is a crime for "two or more persons [to] conspire...
to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or
any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose."' Conspiracy is distinct
1. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). The statute states in full:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to
defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or
more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment
provided for such misdemeanor.
Id.
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from the substantive crime contemplated by the conspiracy and is charged as a
separate offense. 2 Acquittal on a conspiracy charge does not bar prosecution of the
substantive offense.3 Likewise, acquittal of the substantive offense does not bar
conviction on the conspiracy count.4 Conspiracy, coined the prosecutor's "darling,", 5 is one of the most commonly charged federal crimes. The offense of
conspiracy has great breadth, and prosecutors have applied it to a variety of
situations. 6 Commentators have noted that "it is clear that a conspiracy charge
one who must defend
gives the prosecution certain unique advantages and that
7
burden."
heavy
particularly
a
bears
charge
a
against such
The Supreme Court has described the gravity of the conspiracy offense:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be
committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest character,
sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of
the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws,
educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal
practices. And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection,
requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to the importance of
punishing it when discovered. 8
In addition to § 371, there are specific provisions proscribing conspiracy in more
than twenty federal statutes. 9 These provisions attach to the particular substantive
Two sections of the Code originally outlawed the illegal purposes. These sections were combined in 1948 to
form the present statute. See H.R. REP. No. 80-304, at 28 (1947) (discussing origin of 18 U.S.C. § 371).
2. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643-44 (1946) (holding "conspiracy is a partnership in crime"

distinct from substantive offense).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 909 F.2d 431 (11 th Cit. 1990) (reversing conspiracy conviction while
affirming false claims and false statements convictions).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 980 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming conviction of

conspiracy to make false statements and acquittal of two counts of making false statements). However, where the
government's theory of illegal conspiracy depends upon the defendant's knowledge of and assistance with the
substantive count, acquittal on the substantive count mandates acquittal on the conspiracy count. See, e.g., United
States v. Campbell, 64 F.3d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1995).
5. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925) (Learned Hand, J., concurring).
6. See United States v. Reynolds, 919 F2d 435,439 (7th Cir. 1990) ("rare is the case omitting such a charge").
See generally United States v. Stoner, 98 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing conspiracy as "elastic,
sprawling and pervasive offense") (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-47 (1949));
Developments in the Law-CriminalConspiracy, 72 HARv.L. REV.920 (1959) (discussing development of crime

of conspiracy) [hereinafter Developments].
7. Stoner, 98 F.3d at 533 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr. CRIMINAL LAW
§ 6.4 (b), at 526 (2d ed. 1986)).
8. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946) (quoting UnitedStates v. Rabinowich,238 U.S. 78, 88
(1915)). See also Developments, supra note 6, at 924-25 (holding that because of "antisocial potentialities" of
conspiracy and likelihood that additional substantive offenses will result, state has strong interest in stamping out
conspiracy).
9. See, e.g., the following sections of Title 18: § 224 (1994) (conspiracy to bribe in sporting events); § 241
(1994) (conspiracy to deprive civil rights); § 286 (1994) (conspiracy to defraud federal government with
fraudulent claims); § 351(d) (1994) (conspiracy to kidnap, assault, or assassinate members of Congress and
members-elect); § 372 (1994) (conspiracy to assault or impede federal officer); § 794(c) (1994) (conspiracy to
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offenses of the statute in which they appear. Section 371, on the other hand, applies

generally to any conspiracy where the goal is to "commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States" 10 and proscribes any agreement to
violate a civil or criminal federal law."l
The essential features of a conspiracy-secrecy and concealmentl 2-make
conspiracies difficult to prosecute, especially if they are successful. Consequently,
the law lessens the government's burden of proving the essential elements by only

requiring a showing of the "essential nature of the plan" and "[the conspirators']
connections with it" to ensure that conspirators do not "go free by their very
ingenuity." 13
This Article first outlines, in Section I, the basic elements of a conspiracy
offense under § 371. Defenses available to challenge charges brought under the
statute are discussed in Section III of the Article. Section IV presents the
evidentiary and constitutional guidelines governing admissibility of co-conspirator
hearsay testimony at trials involving conspiracy charges. Section V surveys
various procedural and substantive rules regarding enforcement of the statute.

Finally, the rules governing a conspiracy conviction under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are reviewed in Section VI.
II.

ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE

There are four elements of criminal conspiracy, each of which the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. t 4 A conspiracy exists where there is: (1) an
provide defense information to foreign government); § 1201(c) (1994) (conspiracy to kidnap); § 1962(d) (1994)
(conspiracy to violate any provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO")); § 2384
(1994) (seditious conspiracy); and other provisions of the U.S. Code: 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (conspiracy to restrain
trade); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) (conspiracy to violate Controlled Substances Act); 21 U.S.C. § 963 (1994)
(conspiracy to import or export controlled substance).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); see supra note 1 (quoting text of § 371).
11. See United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524, 528-29 (1921) (holding that predecessor statute to § 371 made it
crime to conspire to violate any civil or criminal federal law); United States v. Tuohey, 867 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir.
1989) (asserting that § 371 applies to both civil and criminal offenses); United States v. Wiesner, 216 F.2d 739,
741-42 (2d Cir. 1954) (stating that Hutto is still applicable to federal criminal code after 1948 revision).
12. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947); United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1053 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that conspiracy is secretive by nature); United States v. Morris, 836 F.2d 1371, 1373 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (same).
13. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 557.
14. United States v. Cart, 25 F.3d 1194, 1202-1203 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that government must prove each
element of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 768 (5th Cir. 1994)
(same); United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Hinlde, 37 F.3d 576,
578 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1015 (1st Cir. 1993) (same); United States v.
Frink, 912 F2d 1413, 1416 (llth Ci. 1990) (same).
Circumstantial evidence alone can suffice to convict a defendant of conspiracy. United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d
381, 386 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Richardson, 14 F.3d 666, 670 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Baker, 985
F.2d 1248, 1255 (4th Cir. 1994); Agofsky, 20 F.3d at 870; United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir.
1994); United States v. Vargas, 986 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Scarbrough, 990 F.2d 296, 299 (7th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Foster, 985 F.2d 466,469 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321
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agreement between at least two parties; (2) to achieve an illegal goal; (3) with
knowledge of the conspiracy and with actual participation in the conspiracy; and
(4) at least one conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.1 5
A. Agreement
The first essential element that the government must prove to establish a

conspiracy is the existence of an agreement between two or more persons1 6 to
work together toward a common goal. The "essence" of a conspiracy "is an
agreement to commit an unlawful act."1 7 However, it is not necessary for the
government to prove a formal agreement.I" An understanding among conspirators
is sufficient to constitute an agreement. 19 However, "[m]ere association with
conspirators" or "mere knowledge ... without cooperation" is not enough.2" An
(3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1557 (1lth Cir. 1990); United States v. Morris, 836 F.2d
1371, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Bavers, 787 F2d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1985).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (setting forth elements of conspiracy); see also United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860,
866 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that government must prove following elements: agreement to obstruct justice,
knowing and voluntary participation by defendant, and at least one overt act committed in furtherance thereof);
United States v. Knox, 68 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Brandon, 17 .3d 409, 428 (1st Cir.
1994) (same); United States v. Dolt, 27 E3d 235, 238 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Hinkle, 37 F.3d at 578 (same);
United States v. Kammer, 1 .3d 1161, 1164 (1 th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Powell, 853 F.2d 601, 604
(8th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Indelicato, 800 F.2d 1482, 1483 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
16. The legal fiction that a husband and wife are one person in the eyes of the law has been abandoned for the
purposes of § 371. Thus, a husband and wife are legally capable of conspiring with each other. See e.g., United
States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1960).
17. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946);
see also United States v. Mittelstaedt, 31 F.3d 1208, 1218 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the gist of conspiracy is
agreement to commit at least one unlawful act); Carr, 25 F3d at 1201 (asserting that conspiracy consists of
agreement to achieve common goal); United States v. Mackay, 33 E3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that
essence of conspiracy is "agreement to engage in concerted unlawful activity"); United States v. Milligan, 17
E3d 177, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that government must prove agreement between two or more people to
commit offense); Agofsky, 20 F.3d at 870 (holding that government must prove "agreement to achieve an illegal
purpose"); United States v. Arutunoff, I F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1993) ("essence of conspiracy is an agreement
to commit an unlawful act"); United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 E2d 298, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same);
United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 792 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Parker, 839 F.2d 1473, 1478
(11th Cir. 1988) (requiring that government prove "meeting of the minds"); United States v. Krasovich, 819 F.2d
253, 255 (9th Cir. 1987) (asserting that government must prove agreement to pursue common objective).
18. See United States v. Armstrong, 16 F.3d 289, 293-94 (8th Cir. 1994) ("agreement need not be express or
formal"); Cassiere,4 F.3d at 1015 (holding that agreement need not be express); United States v. Piche, 981 F.2d
706, 717 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that agreement may be inferred from facts and circumstances); United States v.
Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1354 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that formal or express agreement not required);
United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Scanzello, 832 F.2d 18, 20
(3d Cir. 1987) (same).
19. See United States v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that, despite incongruent goals, proof
of general agreement on "essential nature of plan" is sufficient); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 768 (5th
Cir. 1994) (determining that agreement may be tacit); Milligan, 17 F.3d at 182-83 (holding that "tacit or mutual
understanding" amongst conspirators will suffice).
20. United States v. Mendez, 496 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S.
205, 207 (1940) (finding that illicit distiller who lacked knowledge of conspiracy not guilty of conspiracy even
though he furnished supplies).
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agreement may be proven through circumstantial evidence 2 or may be inferred

from the defendant's actions. 22 The existence of a conspiratorial agreement may
23
also be proven by evidence of previous similar criminal activities. Coconspirators may enter the agreement at any time during the course of the

21. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942) (holding that common purpose and plan may be inferred
from "development and a collocation of circumstances") (quoting United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834,839 (2d
Cir. 1938)); United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1995) ("the jury may infer an agreement from
concert of action"); Milligan, 17 F.3d at 182-83 ("acts done with a common purpose can establish an implicit
agreement"); Armstrong, 16 F3d at 294 (holding that agreement can be proved through circumstantial evidence);
Arutunoff, I F.3d at 1116 (holding that conspiracy can be inferred from "circumstances, acts and conduct of the
parties"); United States v. Reveron Martinez, 836 F.2d 684, 691 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding proof of conspiracy
inferable from concert of activity); Hooks, 848 F.2d at 792 (holding that circumstantial evidence and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom concerning relationship of parties, overt acts, and totality of conduct may serve as
proof); United States v. Simon, 839 F.2d 1461, 1469 (11 th Cir. 1988) (same).
22. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974) ("The existence of an agreement may be shown by
circumstances indicating that criminal defendants acted in concert to achieve a common goal"); United States v.
Lampkins, 47 F.3d 175, 180 (7th Cir. 1995) ("[e]vidence of prior bad acts that occured before the start of the
conspiracy is admissible in this Circuit to establish specific intent, even if the defendant concedes intent, if the
evidence satisfies other conditions of admissibility"); Milligan, 17 F.3d at 182-83 (holding that conspiracy can be
inferred from defendant's actions); Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1015 (holding that agreement can be inferred from
"defendants' words and actions and the interdependence of activities and persons involved") (quoting United
States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1990)); United States v. Melendez, 995 F.2d 1068 (table), 1993
WL 173686, at *2 (6th Cir. May 24, 1993) ("evidence of prior bad acts on the part of the conspirators that predate
the conspiracy is admissible to show the background and development of the conspiracy, the relationship between
the conspirators, and the significance of later acts"); United States v. Molinaro, 11 F3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that agreement between co-defendants to defraud bank board could be inferred from the way defendants
structured transactions and prepared documentation); Arutunoff, I F3d at 1116 (holding that agreement can be
inferred if "defendant's conduct [is] interdependent with the conduct of other conspirators," requiring defendant's
activities to "facilitate the endeavors of other conspirators or the venture as a whole"); United States v. Rosa, 11
E3d 315, 334 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that, "[w]e have held repeatedly that it is within the court's discretion to
admit evidence of prior acts to inform the jury of the background of the conspiracy charged, in order to help
explain how the illegal relationship between participants in the crime developed, or to explain how the mutual
trust existed between conspirators"); United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 (10th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
"highly probative value of uncharged prior acts evidence to show motive, intent, knowledge, or plan in the
context of a conspiracy prosecution"); United States v. Pintar, 630 E2d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that
defendant need not have knowledge of every aspect of conspiracy to be convicted).
When the government seeks to establish a conspiracy by inference, it must prove each aspect of the alleged
conspiracy. See United States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508, 515 n.7 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[m]ere proximity to the scene of
illicit activity is not sufficient to establish involvement in the conspiracy"); United States v. Bell, 833 F.2d 272,
274-75 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding that mere presence not sufficient to convict person of conspiracy); United States
v. Cardenas-Alvarado, 806 F.2d 566, 569-70 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence which places defendant in "a
climate of activity that reeks of something foul" is insufficient to prove conspiracy); United States v. Percival, 756
F.2d 600, 610 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that at least there must be evidence to support inference that defendant in
some way joined and participated in scheme of conspiracy).
23. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F2d 1321, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that prior bribery
payments can be admitted to show intent); United States v. Espinoza, 578 F.2d 224, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that prior acts of transporting aliens can be admitted because similar to case at trial and relevant to show
knowledge and intent); United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that evidence of
previous arrest for marijuana possession admissible in case of conspiracy to import and possess marijuana with
intent to distribute). See generally FED. R. EVID. § 404 (b) (permitting introduction of other crimes, wrongs, and
acts to show, among other things, intent and motive).
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24

Under § 371, an agreement between only two actors, one of whom is a
government agent, cannot support a conspiracy conviction. 25 However, a government agent, often a government informant, can serve as a link between a true
conspirator and a defendant. 2 6

In addition, an agreement by two persons to commit a particular crime cannot be
prosecuted as a conspiracy if the commission of the crime itself requires the
participation of two persons. 27 This rule, called Wharton's Rule, 28 "applies only to
offenses that require concerted criminal activity.", 29 If, however, the number of
substantive
actual conspirators exceeds the number required to commit the
30
separately.
conspiracy
the
charge
may
offense, then the government

For the purposes of § 371, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine generally
does not apply.3 ' Therefore, corporations, their officers, agents, or employees can

24. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1947).
25. See United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1242 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) ("[confidential informants and
government agents cannot serve as the second party to a conspiracy"); United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 369
(6th Cir. 1991) (holding that conspiracy cannot be proven between defendant and government agent); United
States v. Vasquez, 874 F.2d 1515, 1516-17 (11 th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Manotas-Mejia, 824 F.2d 360,
364-65 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); see also United States v. Ritter, 989 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no
conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1958 when only co-conspirators were government agents). Section 371 requires
a bilateral conspiracy. An agreement between two or more bona fide conspirators is a necessary element of the
crime. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
26. See United States v. Fincher, 723 F.2d 862, 863 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that agent may "link" genuine
conspirators) (citing Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1965)).
27. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 773-74 n.5. (1975). Wharton's Rule is "an exception to the general
principle that a conspiracy and the substantive offense that is its immediate end do not merge upon proof of the
latter." Id. at 781-82. Itwas designed to eliminate the danger of defendants receiving dual punishment for the
same crime. Id. at 786 n. 18.
28. Wharton's Rule owes its name to Francis Wharton, whose treatise on criminal law recognized the doctrine
and its essential rationale. E WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 110, 491 (1846).
The current formulation of Wharton's concept is stated more directly in CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON's
CRIMINAL LAW § 684 (1996).
29. lannelli, 420 U.S. at 785; see United States v. McCord, 33 F3d 1434, 1439-40 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that
Wharton's rule applies when it is impossible under any circumstances to commit substantive offense without
cooperative action); United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that conspiracy
conviction not prohibited by Wharton's rule because a single individual is capable of mail fraud); see also United
States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 1989) (listing examples of concerted criminal activity: adultery,
incest, bigamy, and dueling).
30. lannelli,420 U.S. at 775,789 (rejecting argument that, by requiring "five or more persons" be involved to
prove violation of Organized Crime Control Act § 1955, Congress intended to merge conspiracy and substantive
offense into one crime); United States v. Phillips, 959 F.2d 1187, 1190 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Wharton's Rule
does not apply where more people than necessary for substantive offense are involved in conspiracy).
31. See United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1993) ("a corporation may be liable
under § 371 for conspiracies entered into by its agents and employees"); Alamo Fence Co. v. United States, 240
F2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1957) ("no contention ... can reasonably be made, that the federal statute[] involved [is]
not directed against corporate misconduct"). In the antitrust context, the "intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine"
expressly provides that a parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary are not legally capable of conspiring
with each other under § I of the Sherman Act, because there is a complete unity of interest between the two
entities. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (holding corporation and
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conspire with one another in violation of § 37 1.32
Application of the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine in a civil rights context,
however, varies among the circuits. Commentators note that five circuits have
extended the doctrine to actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and held that
a corporation and its employees cannot conspire, while five others "have severely
33
limited or questioned the applicability of the doctrine in the civil rights context."
B. Illegal Goal
The second essential element in a federal conspiracy charge is that the conspiracy have an illegal goal.3 4 The government must establish that the aim of the
conspiracy was to defraud or hinder a lawful federal government objective (the
defraud clause) or to violate a federal law (the offense clause).3 5 Section 371's
"defraud" clause broadly applies to "any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing,

obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of [the Federal]
Government."-3 6 The language of the defraud clause is "not confined to fraud as
its wholly owned subsidiary incapable of conspiring for purposes of Sherman Act); JOSEPH McSoRLEY, A
PORTABLE GUIDE To FEDERAL CONSPIRACY LAW-DEVELOPING STRATEGIES FOR CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES 14-15

(1996).
32. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d at 979 (declining to "insulate all corporations" by extending the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to § 371 conspiracies); United States v. Stevens, 909 F2d 431, 432-33 (11th Cir.
1990) (declining to expand "fiction" that corporation cannot conspire with itself in criminal context but holding
that where sole stockholder completely controls corporation, stockholder cannot conspire with corporation);
United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[alctions of two or more agents of a corporation,
conspiring together on behalf of the corporation, may lead to conspiracy convictions of the agents (because the
corporate veil does not shield them from criminal liability) and of the corporation (because its agents conspired on
its behalf)."); United States v. S & Vee Cartage Co., 704 F.2d 914,920 (6th Cir. 1983) ("in the criminal context a
corporation may be convicted of conspiring with its officers").
33. McSorely, supra note 31 at 15 (collecting cases regarding whether corporation may conspire in civil rights
context).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Reifsteck, 841 F.2d 701,704 (6th Cir. 1988) (unlawful use of electronic listening
device); United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 792 (7th Cir. 1988) (aiding in estate tax fraud); United States v.
Powell, 853 F.2d 601, 604 (8th Cir. 1988) (bank robbery); United States v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426, 430 (10th Cir.
1988) (tax evasion); United States v. Joseph, 835 E2d 1149, 1152 (6th Cir. 1987) (rigged gambling); United States
v. Bruun, 809 F.2d 397, 410 (7th Cir. 1987) (bank and securities fraud); United States v. Krasovich, 819 F.2d 253,
255 (9th Cir. 1987) (tax evasion); United States v. Giancola, 783 F.2d 1549, 1553 (11 th Cir. 1986) (failure to
report bank transactions over $10,000 as required by federal law).
36. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861
(1966)); see Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (holding that conspiracy under § 371
means to "interfere with or obstruct one of ...lawful governmental functions"); see also United States v.
Stavroulakis, 952 F.2d 686, 694 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that bank fraud statute requires attempt to deceive
federally chartered or insured financial institution); United States v. Tuohey, 867 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that § 371 "criminalizes any willful impairment of a legitimate function of government"); Hooks, 848
F.2d at 792 (holding that tax fraud constitutes violation of defraud clause); United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908,
916 (2d Cir. 1957) (ruling it is conspiracy to defraud United States by impeding and obstructing the functions of
Department of the Treasury; subsequently known as "Klein" conspiracy).
18 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) defines the term "agency." Courts have given "agency" an expansive definition. See, e.g.,
Dennis, 384 U.S. at 861-62 (National Labor Relations Board is agency); United States v. Browning, 723 F.2d

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:739

that term has been defined in the common law.", 3 7 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's language in Hammerschmidt v. United States38 seemed to require that the

means to defraud be dishonest. 39 That being said, Supreme Court cases both prior
and subsequent to Hammerschmidthave upheld conspiracy convictions which did
not charge dishonest or deceptive means." Some circuits have affirmed convictions on conspiracy counts absent allegations of fraud or dishonesty, 41 while other
circuits require such a showing. It is not necessary
that the conspiracy subject the
43
Ioss.
pecuniary
or
government to property
Similarly, the "offense" clause of § 371 is not limited to offenses committed
against the United States or its agents, but it rather applies to any conspiracy to
violate federal law.44 To fall within the offense clause, the object of the conspiracy
1544, 1549 (11th Cir. 1984) (Internal Revenue Service is agency); United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769,771 (2d
Cir. 1980) (Department of the Treasury is agency); United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1254 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (Securities and Exchange Commission is agency). Virtually any method used to defraud the United States
will suffice for the purposes of the statute. See, e.g., Tanner, 483 U.S. at 129 ("conspiracy to defraud the United
States may be effected by the use of third parties"); Dennis, 384 U.S. at 862 (holding that filing of false affidavits
with NLRB is fraud against United States); Tramp v. United States, 978 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that
mail and wire fraud against United States supported conspiracy conviction).
37. Dennis, 384 U.S. at 861 (discussing how "defraud" clause of § 371 applies to federal government);
Tuohey, 867 F.2d at 536-37 (discussing scope of defraud clause).
38. Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188 (holding that interfering with official action by misrepresentation,
overreaching, or chicanery constitutes conspiracy).
'39. Id. (holding that fraud is something done by means of "deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are
dishonest").
40. See, e.g., Dennis, 384 U.S. at 861 (stating that submitting false affidavits to National Labor Relations
Board constitutes conspiracy to defraud United States); Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 480 (1910) (holding that
bribery constitutes conspiracy).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Hooks, 848 F2d 785, 792 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that purpose of conspiracy was
to impair, obstruct, or defeat "lawful function of any department of Government"); United States v. Shoup, 608
E2d 950, 963-64 (3d Cir. 1979) (upholding conviction for § 371 conspiracy without proof of dishonesty or
trickery).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that conspiracy to defraud
entails interference with government function by means of "deceit, craft or treachery or at least by means that are
dishonest") (quoting Hammerschmidt, 265 U.S. at 188); United States v. Pintar, 630 F.2d 1270, 1277-79 (8th Cir.
1980) (same); United States v. Peltz, 433 F2d 48, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating Hammerschmidt only narrowed
Haasholding and requiring demonstration of trickery and deceit).
43. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924) (holding that it is not necessary to prove
Government was "subjected to property or pecuniary loss by the fraud"); Haas, 216 U.S. at 479 (holding that it is
not necessary to allege pecuniary loss in conspiracy to defeat or impair promulgation of crop information); United
States v. Tuohey, 867 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that it is not necessary to prove government suffered
pecuniary loss); United States v. Puerto, 730 F.2d 627, 630-31 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (concluding that it is sufficient to
show interference with IRS without showing pecuniary loss to government); United States v. Burgin, 621 F.2d
1352, 1356-57 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that scheme by public official to exert political influence constitutes
conspiracy even when government suffers no pecuniary loss); United States v. Hicks, 619 E2d 752, 757 (8th Cir.
1980) (holding that it is unnecessary to show proof of government's pecuniary or property loss).
44. United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409,422 (lst Cir. 1994) (holding that offense clause applies generally to
federal offenses and conspiracy need not be aimed at United States or its agents); United States v. Falcone, 960
F.2d 988, 990 (lth Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that offense against United States encompasses all offenses
against laws of United States, not just offenses targeted at United States); United States v. Gibson, 881 F.2d 318,
321 (6th Cir. 1989) (same).
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must be the violation of a specific federal statute.45 It is not necessary that the
conspirators intend or know that the conspiracy will violate federal law; a concert
of action is sufficient to prove this element.4 6 In cases where the offense and

defraud clauses overlap, the indictment may charge conspiracy to defraud even
when the object of the conspiracy also violates the offense clause so long as the
indictment provides sufficient notice of the charges. 4 7
C. Knowledge, Intent, and Participation

The third element that the government must prove is that the defendant knew of
the conspiratorial agreement and voluntarily participated in it. 48 The government

45. See United States v. Arch Trading Co., 987 F.2d 1087, 1091 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that "offense" for
purposes of § 371 includes violations of executive orders where Congress has provided criminal sanctions for
such violations).
46. See United States v. Gonzalez, 121 F.3d 928, 935 (5th Cir 1997) ("a defendant's guilty knowledge and
participation in the conspiracy all may be inferred from the 'development and collocation of circumstances'...
the jury may infer the existence of a conspiracy from the presence, association, and concerted action of the
defendant with others"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 726 (1998); United States v. Cyprian, 23 F.3d 1189, 1201-02 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding that government need only prove that defendant knew he was interfering with IRS's ability to
collect taxes, not that defendant knew he was violating actual tax law); United States v. Hem, 926 F.2d 764, 768
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding that government need only show that objective and agreement were unlawful); United
States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 908 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that conviction for conspiracy to commit wire fraud
does not require foreseeability of interstate nature of the wire communication); United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d
785, 792 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that to convict for conspiracy government must prove "at least the degree of
criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense") (quoting Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678
(1959)); United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1080 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that, although objective of
conspiracy was to influence local election, misuse of absentee ballot constituted offense against United States
because it included candidates for federal office); United States v. Gilley, 836 F.2d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 1988)
(requiring proof of agreement to commit acts which "if consummated, would constitute an offense against the
United States") (citing Ingram, 360 U.S. at 677-78); United States v. Petit, 841 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1988)
(ruling that government not required to prove defendants had knowledge that goods were moving in interstate
commerce in order to prove conspiracy to steal goods moving in interstate commerce).
47. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 859 (1966); see Arch Trading, 987 F.2d at 1092 ("when both prongs
of § 371 apply ... the government enjoys considerable latitude in deciding how to proceed"); United States v.
Mohney, 949 F.2d 899, 902 (6th Cir. 1991) ("existence of a specific statutory provision encompassing the charged
conduct does not prevent prosecutors from bringing charges under the defraud clause"); see also United States v.
Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1473-74 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that where conduct violates more than one statute,
broader "defraud" clause is appropriate); United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) (allowing
prosecution under defraud clause where conduct violated specific statutes because an "alteration in the
phraseology of the conspiracy charge [to charge conspiracy under offense clause] could not have assisted ...
defense"); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that notice sufficient for a
prosecution under defraud clause even where internal revenue law was retroactively applied); United States v.
Sans, 731 F.2d 1521, 1533-34 (1 lth Cir. 1984) (holding that indictment under defraud clause was sufficient where
one object of conspiracy was misdemeanor offense); United States v. Shermetaro, 625 F.2d 104, 111 (6th Cir.
1980) (allowing an indictment under defraud clause where conduct proscribed by internal revenue laws). But see
United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186, 1194-95 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that if illegal activity is specifically
prohibited by statute, conspiracy must be prosecuted under "offense" clause rather than "defraud" clause in order
to provide clear notice).
48. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1940) (holding that, in order to prove participation in
conspiracy, government must prove defendant was aware his actions would further conspiracy); United States v.
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need not prove that the defendant knew all the details 49 or objectives 50 of the
conspiracy or that the defendant knew the identity of all the participants in the
conspiracy.5 Thus, the existence of a conspiracy and a defendant's participation in
it can be inferred from the circumstances and "need not be proved by direct

evidence.",5 2 Acts committed by the defendant which furthered the objectives of
Brown, 31 F.3d 484, 490 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that government must prove defendant had knowledge of
conspiracy and intended to participate); United States v. Agofsky, 20 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); United
States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1270
(4th Cir. 1993) (requiring government to prove knowledge and participation); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d
565, 581 (Ist Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States
v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1167 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91 (3d Cir.
1988) (same); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1233 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Gonzalez, 810
F.2d 1538, 1542 (11 th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 1984) (same).
49. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (holding that it is only necessary to show
conspirators knew of conspiracy's general scope); United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that, in prosecution for conspiracy to commit mail fraud, "no element need be proved by direct evidence")
(quoting United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d 526, 537 (5th Cir. 1988)); United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d
409, 428 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that government need only prove that defendant had "knowledge of the basic
agreement" of conspiracy to commit bank fraud); United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1546 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that government need only prove that defendant knew "general nature and extent" of conspiracy to
receive stolen goods); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745,768 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant need not
be privy to all details of conspiracy involving fraudulent real estate loans); United States v. Milligan, 17 F.3d 177,
183 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that government need not prove that defendant knew all details of conspiracy to
commit mail fraud); United States v. Marshall, 985 F.2d 901, 905 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the same, for money
laundering and drug distribution conspiracy).
50. Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1242 (holding that defendant need only know essential objectives to constitute
knowledge of money laundering conspiracy); United States v. Cassiere, 4 E3d 1006, 1015 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that defendant need not know all objectives of wire fraud conspiracy); United States v. Wiley, 846 F2d 150, 153
(2d Cir. 1988) (holding that knowledge of all objectives in conspiracy to defraud not required); United States v.
Adams, 759 F.2d 1099, 1114 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that knowledge of all goals of conspiracy not required)
(citing Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 558).
51. Blumenthal, 332 U.S. at 557. The Supreme Court stated:
Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The more completely
they are achieved, the more successful the crime. Hence the law rightly gives room for allowing
the conviction of those discovered upon showing sufficiently the essential nature of the plan and
their connections with it, without requiring evidence of knowledge of all its details or of the
participation of others. Otherwise the difficulties, not only of discovery, but of certainty in proof
and of correlating proof with pleading would become insuperable, and conspirators would go free
by their very ingenuity.
Id.; see also Brandon, 17 F.3d at 428 (holding that defendant need not know identity of all members of
conspiracy); Milligan, 17 F.3d at 183 (same); Agofsky, 20 F.3d at 870 (holding that government can convict
despite "fact that identity of some or all other member of the conspiracy remains unknown"); United States v.
Hernandez, 986 F.2d 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that knowledge of identity of all participants not required);
United States v. Reed, 980 F.2d 1568, 1582 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Young, 954 F.2d 614, 619
(10th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F2d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 1991) (same); United
States v. Donsky, 825 F.2d 746, 753-54 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that conspiracy can be found even where
government could not prove each co-conspirator knew of details or participation of others); United States v.
Shermetaro, 625 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that defendant need not know "the full scope ....the
detailed plans, operation, membership, or even the purpose of other members in the conspiracy").
52. United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); accord United States v. Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181,1187 (5th
Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant's knowing involvement in conspiracy can be established through circumstan-
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the conspiracy are often sufficient to show that the defendant was a knowing
participant.5 3 Once the government proves the existence of a conspiracy, only
"slight connection" evidence may be needed to show that the defendant was a
member of the conspiracy. 54 Deliberate avoidance of knowledge does not preclude

tial evidence); Brandon, 17 F.3d at 428 (holding that knowledge and intent can be proven through inferences from
circumstantial evidence); United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); United States v.
Whittington, 26 E3d 456, 465 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that proof of knowing participation in conspiracy can be
shown by "circumstantial evidence, such as [defendant's] relationship with other members of the conspiracy, the
length of this association, [defendant's] attitude, conduct and the nature of the conspiracy"); United States v.
Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1368 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant's participation in conspiracy can be
reasonably inferred from circumstantial evidence); United States v. Thomas, 8 F.3d 1552, 1556 (11 th Cir. 1993)
(holding that close association with co-conspirator is "factor that can be considered as evidence of defendant's
participation in a conspiracy"); United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 792 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that
'existence and common purpose must often be proved by circumstantial evidence" because of the secretive
nature of conspiracies); United States v. Simon, 839 F.2d 1461, 1469 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that participation
need not be proven by direct evidence).
53. United States v. Gonzalez, 121 F.3d 928 (5th Cir 1997) ("The essential elements of conspiracy may be
established by circumstantial evidence"), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 726 (1998); Cassiere, 4 E3d at 1015 (holding
that defendant's participation in conspiracy can be inferred from defendant's actions); United States v. Locascio, 6
F.3d 924, 944-45 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant-underboss's presence in head of crime family's apartment
during criminal activity planning meetings was functional part of conspiracy and was, therefore, sufficient
circumstantial evidence of defendant's knowing participation); United States v. Investment Enter., Inc., 10 F.3d
263, 267 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that close relationship between defendant and co-conspirator was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove defendant knew of conspiracy); United States v. Sykes, 977 F.2d 1242, 1247 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant's participation in conspiracy can be inferred from defendant's actions); United
States v. Ashworth, 836 F2d 260, 265 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Alvarez, 837 F2d 1024, 1027 (11 th
Cir. 1988) (holding that proof of acts committed in furtherance of conspiracy may be sufficient to show knowing
participation in conspiracy). But see United States v. Collins, 966 F2d 1214, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[A] person
who is indifferent to the goals of an ongoing conspiracy does not become a party to this conspiracy merely
because that person knows that his or her actions might somehow be furthering that conspiracy.); United States v.
Veksler, 862 E Supp. 1337, 1339 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that evidence that defendant knew or suspected that
something illegal was occurring and was willing to participate in that activity is insufficient to support a
conspiracy conviction), affd 62 F3d 544 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 780 (1996).
54. United States v. Leahy, 82 F3d 624, 633 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that once government proves existence of
conspiracy and defendant's intent to further it, slight connection between defendant and conspiracy suffices to
prove knowing participation); Brandon, 17 F.3d at 428 (same); Whittington, 26 F.3d at 465 (same); Milligan, 17
F.3d at 183 (same); Agofsky, 20 F3d at 870 (same); United States v. Pinkney, 15 F.3d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1994)
(same); United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1474 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d
981, 991 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that only slight connection required to convict defendant); United States v.
Muehlbauer, 892 E2d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); cf United States v. Villegas, 911 F.2d 623, 629 (11 th Cir.
1990) (holding that mere presence or association with conspirators insufficient); United States v. Morris, 836 E2d
1371, 1374 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that buyer-seller relationship does not make out conspiracy even if item sold
is one to be used illegally); United States v. Wexler, 838 E2d 88, 91 (3d. Cir. 1988) (holding that inferences arising
from "keeping bad company" not enough for conspiracy conviction); United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1238
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of crime not enough to establish that
individual is part of conspiracy, nor is mere presence at scene of drug distribution sufficient); United States v.
Ascarrunz, 838 F.2d 759, 763 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that mere close association with co-conspirator not enough
to support inference of participation in conspiracy, but jury may rely on association along with other evidence to
find conspiracy); United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1359 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that unless buyer
knowingly assumes role instrumental to conspiracy's success, buyer-seller relationship not indicative of
conspiracy).
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a finding of involvement in the conspiracy. 5 5
D. Overt Act
The fourth and final element of a federal conspiracy charge is the performance
of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.5 6 The function of the overt act
requirement is to demonstrate that the conspiracy was actually operative, rather
than a mere scheme in the minds of the actors.57 The overt act need not be
unlawful, 58 nor need it be the substantive offense charged in the indictment.5 9
Furthermore, the defendant need not have committed an overt act: he is chargeable
so long as a co-conspirator has committed such an act. 60

Under the theory of vicarious liability, the reasonably foreseeable overt acts of
one co-conspirator, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, are attributable to
the other conspirators. 6 ' In establishing liability for the conspiracy charge, the
55. United States v. Richardson, 14 F.3d 666, 671-72 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding willful blindness instruction
appropriate when defendant intentionally avoids gaining knowledge of the obvious); United States v. Mancuso,
42 F.3d 836, 846 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that knowledge of fact may be inferred from willful blindness to
existence of fact); Whittington, 26 F.3d at 463 (holding willful blindness instruction appropriate when defendants
go to "great lengths to insulate [themselves] from the fraud perpetrated"); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745,
767-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding deliberate ignorance instruction appropriate when defendant claims lack of guilty
knowledge but evidence supports inference of deliberate indifference); United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417,
433 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Alvarez, 837 F.2d at 1028 (holding that deliberate ignorance instruction warranted);
United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1021-22 (2d Cir. 1986) (same).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 560 n.18 (1947) (holding that
"commission of an overt act" required by the predecessor to today's § 371).
57. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957); see also United States v. Hurley, 957 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
1992) (holding that lawful activity may furnish basis for conviction for conspiracy).
58. Yates, 354 U.S. at 334; United States v. Crabtree, 979 F.2d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Montour, 944 F.2d 1019, 1026 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hem, 926 F.2d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Reifsteck, 841 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 1075 (1st Cir.
1987).
59. See Yates, 354 U.S. at 334 ("[it is] not necessary that an overt act be the substantive crime charged in the
indictment as the object of the conspiracy"); United States v. Sarault, 840 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1988)
(holding that overt act need only be concrete step toward carrying out agreement, nor one that actually
accomplishes goal of conspiracy); United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that act need
not be substantive crime that is object of conspiracy or even be criminal in character).
60. United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Castro, 972 F.2d 1107, 1110
(9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gresser, 935 F.2d 96, 101 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465,
1477 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Sanchez, 917 F.2d 607, 612 (1st Cir. 1990).
61. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946) (holding that act of one partner in crime is admissible
against another where act was done in furtherance of criminal undertaking and was -reasonably foreseeable)
(citing Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)); United States v. Castaneda, 16 F.3d 1504, 1511 (9th Cir.
1994) (affirming "Pinkerton" instruction on vicarious liability); United States v. Williams, 986 F.2d 86, 90 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding defendant liable not only for his conduct but also for reasonably foreseeable actions of
co-conspirators); United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 181, 185 (10th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Eyster, 948
F.2d 1196, 1206 n.13 (11th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Labat, 905 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 1990) (same);
United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1135 (3d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Thom, 917 F.2d 170, 175
(5th Cir. 1990) (same). But see United States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 174 (6th Cit. 1988) (holding defendant
liable only for acts of co-conspirator of which defendant "should reasonably have known").

1998]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

circuit courts generally find a defendant liable for acts committed by her coconspirators both prior to, as well as during the defendant's participation."
However, a defendant cannot be held criminally liable for substantive offenses
committed by others involved in the conspiracy before she joined it6 3 or after she
withdrew from the conspiracy. 64
III. DEFENSES

Defendants can challenge conspiracy charges by claiming a failure to prove the
specific elements of the offense 6 5 or by contesting the charge on more general
grounds. Such defenses include: statute of limitations, insufficiency of indictment,
variance, multiplicitous indictment, insufficient evidence, withdrawal, and a number of other defenses. These defenses will be discussed in turn.
A. Statute of Limitations
Since no provision of § 371 provides an express statute of limitations for
conspiracy, the general five year limitation for non-capital offenses applies.6 6 The
five year limitation period also applies to the conspiracy provisions of other federal
statutes unless they expressly provide otherwise. 6 7 The statute of limitations runs
from the date of the last overt act committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. 68 A
62. See, e.g., United States v. O'Campo, 973 F.2d 1015, 1021-22 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding defendant
responsible for overt acts of co-conspirators prior to involvement in conspiracy); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d
1206, 1214 (2d Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Barksdale-Contreras, 972 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1992) (same);
United States v. Adamo, 882 F.2d 1218, 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant who joins conspiracy
"[takes] the conspiracy as he found it" and is responsible for overt acts committed before he joined) (quoting
United States v. Coe, 718 F.2d 830, 839 (7th Cir. 1983)); United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 908 (2d Cir.
1988) ("[conspiracy] defendant may be legally responsible for acts of co-conspirators prior to that defendant's
entry into the conspiracy").
63. See United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that there is no retroactive
liability for substantive offense); accord O'Campo, 973 F.2d at 1022-23 (same); Blackmaon, 839 F.2d at 909
(same).
64. See infra Section I.F of this Article (discussing requirements for effective withdrawal from conspiracy
and defendant's liability for acts of co-conspirators after defendant's withdrawal); see also Lothian, 976 F.2d at
1262 (holding that there is no liability for substantive offenses after withdrawal); United States v. Richardson, 939
F.2d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 1991) (same).
65. See supra Sections H.A to 1I.D (discussing four essential elements of conspiracy).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994); see United States v. Gomto, 792 F.2d 1028, 1033 n.3 (I1th Cir. 1986) (holding
that government must prove that each crime charged in indictment occurred within previous five years); United
States v. Davis, 533 F.2d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that for § 371 prosecution, indictment must contain
proof of commission of overt act within statute of limitations); United States v. Lowder, 492 F.2d 953,955-56 (4th
Cir. 1974) (holding that statute of limitation is supplied by particular statute; where it is not, 18 U.S.C. § 3282
applies unless otherwise specified by law).
67. See supra note 9 (listing other federal statutes containing conspiracy provisions). A conspiracy to commit
an offense cannot have a longer statute of limitations than that of the substantive offense. Bridges v. United States,
346 U.S. 209, 223 (1953).
68. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946). The Court stated, "Ithe statute of limitations, unless
suspended, runs from the last overt act during the existence of the conspiracy. The overt acts averred and proved
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conspiracy ends when the central criminal purpose of the conspiracy has been
attained. 6 9 Continued concealment of prior acts in furtherance of the conspiracy
after the objective has been attained does not extend the statute of limitations 70 or

satisfy the requirements of co-conspirator hearsay admissibility under Rule 801 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7
B. Insufficiency of the Indictment

An indictment must contain the elements of the offense charged,72 and will be
deemed insufficient unless it sets forth the offense using the words of the statute

itself. 73 If the indictment is not specific enough to apprise the defendant of the
charges he or she must defend against at trial, the Fifth Amendment may be
violated.74 However, if a defendant's objection to an indictment is untimely, courts
will view the indictment as valid.7 5
may thus mark the duration, as well as the scope, of the conspiracy." Id. (citations omitted). Although the effects
of the conspiracy may be continuing, the conspiracy itself is not viewed as continuing unless the co-conspirators
are cooperating to keep it going. id. See also Flintkote v. United States, 7 F.3d 870, 873 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding
that running of statute of limitations commences from end of conspiracy).
69. United States v. Roshko, 969 F2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding conspiracy to defraud government ended
when Immigration and Naturalization Service approved defendant's application for a green card, object of
conspiracy); United States v. Payne, 978 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding conspiracy not complete until
every element of crime has occurred); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding criminal
purpose of conspiracy still continuing when distribution of money not completed).
70. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391,402 (1957) (holding that concealment of conspiracy whose
objective has been attained does not constitute separate conspiracy to conceal); Krulewitch v. United States, 336
U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949) (holding that concealment is incident to any conspiracy and does not constitute a
conspiracy in and of itself); United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, 1082 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that concealing a
conspiracy does not extend its length for statute of limitations purposes).
However, a new, separate agreement to cover up a conspiracy after its completion may extend the running of
the statute of limitations. See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 404, 414 (holding that conspiracy was not continuing for
statute of limitations purposes because conspirators made no express agreement to conceal conspiracy after
completion); see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 56 F.3d 932, 934 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that acts of
concealment further conspiracywhen concealment is central purpose of conspiratorial agreement).
71. See Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 401-2 (holding that co-conspirator's declarations made to foil detection were
inadmissible under narrow co-conspirator exception to hearsay rule); United States v. Vowiell, 869 F.2d 1264,
1267 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that hearsay statements made four days after escape were inadmissible because
objectives of conspiracy accomplished).
72. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (stating that purpose of this requirement is two-fold:
(1) to ensure that defendant has sufficient notice of offense charged to enable him to put on defense and (2) to
protect him from double jeopardy).
73. See United States v. Yefsky, 994 F.2d 885, 893 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Paulino, 935 F.2d 739, 750
(6th Cir. 1991).
74. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962) ("To allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a
subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the indictment would
deprive the defendant of a basic protection which the guaranty of the intervention of a grand jury was designed to
secure.").

75. FED. R. CRim. P. 12(b)(2); See United States v. Stands, 105 F3d 1565, 1575 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[ajn
indictment that is challenged after jeopardy has attached is liberally construed in favor of sufficiency"); United
States v. Ruelas, 106 F.3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996) ("[a]lthough Ruelas may raise a defective indictment claim
at any time, we liberally construe the indictment in this case because he did not object to it before he pleaded
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C. Variance
76
An indictment violates the Sixth Amendment requirement of adequate notice
when the conspiracy charged in the indictment varies from the conspiracy proven
at trial.77 However, a court will reverse a conviction for variance only if the

variance is material and the defendant's substantial rights7 8 were prejudiced. 79 The

guilty"); Lemons v. O'Sullivan, 54 F.3d 357, 363 (7th Cir. 1995) ("defendant must raise any objection to the
indictment prior to trial.. .[otherwise] 'the indictment must be upheld unless it is so defective that it does not...
charge any offense for which the defendant is convicted' ") (quoting United States v. James, 923 F.2d 1261, 1266
(7th Cir. 1991)); United States v. Ospina, 18 F.3d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1994) ("defects arising out of the institution
of the prosecution must be raised prior to trial"); United States v. Rodriguez, 738 F.2d 13, 15 (5th Cir. 1984)
("[olbjections that are not raised in a timely fashion are deemed to be waived, unless the court chooses to grant
relief.., based on a showing of good cause"); United States v. Paolicelli, 505 F.2d 971, 973 (4th Cir. 1974)
("[t]he failure to raise the issue (defect in indictment) at or prior to trial... constituted a waiver"). Some courts
require that objections be raised prior to the trial. See, e.g., United States v. Trujillo, 714 F2d 102, 105 n.1 (11 th
Cir. 1983) (holding that failure to raise objections based on defects in indictment prior to trial waives those
objections); United States v. Visconti, 261 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Ci. 1958) ("[slince the alleged defect in the
indictment was not raised before trial, it was waived").
Other courts allow objections to be raised up to the end of the trial. See, e.g., United States v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d
297, 301 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that challenge to indictment is timely under Rule 12(b) if presented either'by
pretrial motion or at trial); United States v. Pupo, 841 F.2d 1235, 1239 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that, to be timely,
objection must be raised prior to verdict).
76. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part that the accused shall "be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
77. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 758 (1946) (holding that when only one conspiracy is
charged and eight are proven, conviction is improper); United States v. Carr, 5 F.3d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 1993)
(finding that if indictment alleges one conspiracy and evidence supports multiple ones, variance results); United
States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 960 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that in order to find defendant guilty, jury
must find defendant was member of conspiracy charged in indictment, not some other conspiracy); cf. United
States v. Santa-Manzano, 842 F.2d I, 2 (1st Cir. 1988) (reading Sixth Amendment as assurance that government
will prosecute defendant on charges voted by grand jury, not on charges not included in indictment); United States
v. Pinto, 838 F.2d 426,433 (10th Cir. 1988) (same).
Some courts have held that variance may be cured by jury instruction. See United States v. Mack, 837 F2d 254,
258 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that variance can be cured by cautionary jury instruction); United States v.
Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1082 (8th Cir. 1988) (determining that if indictment alleges single conspiracy but proof
at trial reveals more than one, then the court should give multiple conspiracy instruction with cautionary
instruction that evidence relating to other conspirators may not be used against defendant).
78. The substantial rights of the defendant can be violated in a number of ways. First, if the defendant is not
apprised of the charges he would have to defend against at trial, prejudice may occur. Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 82 (1935); see United States v. Santiago, 83 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that defendant's stipulated
misstatement confirming seized drugs as marijuana was not variance affecting defendant's substantial rights
because defendant was not misled or surprised by variance); United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1359 (5th Cir.
1994) (finding no variance if defendant informed of charges so as not to be surprised); Pinto, 838 F.2d at 433-34
(same); see generally United States v. Reed, 980 F.2d 1568, 1581 (11th Cir. 1993).
Second, substantial rights may be violated if guilt will be transferred to the defendant when evidence of a
conspiracy to which the defendant is not a party is introduced at trial. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 774. Compare United
States v. Moran, 984 F.2d 1299, 1304 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding no substantial prejudice when evidence
incriminating to other defendants is distinct) with United States v. Harris, 8 F.3d 943, 947 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating
that substantial prejudice occurs if testimony of one conspirator prejudices jury mind against one who is not part
of conspiracy). Third, if the defendant will be exposed to double jeopardy, substantial prejudice occurs. Berger,
295 U.S. at 82. See infra note 84 (discussing Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy).
79. See, e.g., Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 773-74 (holding that substantial prejudice occurs when the number of
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jury determines whether there is a variance between the number of conspiracies
charged in the indictment and the number proven at trial."0 Unless the change is a
matter of form rather than substance, 81 an indictment may 82not be amended to
correct the variance except by resubmission to the grand jury.
D. Multiplicitous Indictment

A multiplicitous indictment arises when a single conspiracy offense is charged
in more than one count. 83 Such a defect violates the double jeopardy clause of the
Fifth Amendment.8 4
conspiracies and conspirators are so great that jury transfers guilt among them); Thomas, 12 F3d at 1358 (stating
that if all conspirators are not charged, no substantial prejudice occurs because defendant still knows what to
defend against at trial); United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 1991) (deciding that separate
jury instructions and separate character of conspiracies suffice to prevent transference of guilt); United States v.
Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385, 1411 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding no transference of guilt between large number of defendants when
their voices are on tape); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (concluding that vague phrasing
of indictment is not substantially prejudicial when defendant knows what to defend against).
80. See United States v. Adams, 1 F.3d 1566, 1584 (11 th Cir. 1993) (holding that the existence of a single
conspiracy is a question for the jury); Malonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 962 (determining that whether conspiracy is multiple
or single is question for jury); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same); United States v.
Lozano, 839 F.2d 1020, 1023 (4th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Tom, 840 F.2d 1221, 1236 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).
A single conspiracy exists where there is one overall agreement to perform various functions to achieve the
objectives of the conspiracy. A single conspiracy may involve subgroups or sub-agreements as part of the overall
conspiracy. United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1987).
If a single conspiracy is charged and multiple ones are proven, the defendant can be found guilty if there is
evidence that the defendant participated in the charged conspiracy. See United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745,762
(5th Cir. 1994) (stating that if a single conspiracy is charged and multiple conspiracies are proven, there is no
variance if defendant is involved in one); United States v. Durman, 30 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
variance is not fatal error if jury could have found defendant participated in single, charged conspiracy); Adams, 1
F.3d at 1584 (finding no variance if jury could have found the existence of single conspiracy).
81. See United States v. Bledsoe, 898 F.2d 430, 432 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that amendment deleting word
"public" from indictment was substantial enough to require resubmission to grand jury); cf. United States v.
Floresca, 38 E3d 706 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that constructive amendments of federal indictments are erroneous
per se and must be corrected on appeal); Floresca limited the Bledsoe decision to its facts and overruled it to the
extent necessary to reconcile it with Floresca'sholding. See also United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d
1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that variance as to starting date does not constitute reversible error unless time
is material element of charged offense); United States v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that
defendant cannot complain of improper constructive amendment if indictment is actually amended by resubmission to grand jury); United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493, 1506 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that evidence
sufficed to convict defendants on conspiracy charge even if dates of conspiracy were not precisely as alleged in
indictment). But see United States v. Fletcher, 121 F.3d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1997) (determining on appeal that
amendment did not impair "substantial rights" of appellants because it would not have affected outcome of trial).
82. See United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 944 (7th Cir. 1990) (considering constructive amendment
to indictment prejudicial per se because denies defendant right to grand jury and hampers defendant's ability to
prepare adequately for trial); United States v. Zingaro, 858 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding constructive
amendment of indictment per se violation of grand jury clause of Fifth Amendment).
83. See United States v. Holmes, 44 E3d 1150, 1153-54 (2d Cir. 1995) (determining indictment to be
multiplicitous if same conspiracy charged in more than one count); United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534,
1546 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232,239 (6th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v.
Howard, 918 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1990) (same).
84. See Haddock, 956 E2d at 1546 (finding Double Jeopardy Clause violated since multiplicitous indictment

1998]

FEDERAL CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY

E. Insufficient Evidence

The accused may also defend against conspiracy charges by alleging that the
government has failed to establish 86
a conspiracy85 or has failed to establish the

requisite elements of the conspiracy.

F Withdrawal

Withdrawal from a conspiracy requires more than the cessation of participation:
the conspirator must commit "[a]ffirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the
conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach coconspirators."

7

To escape liability, an actor must unequivocally withdraw before

any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is committed.88 However, if an act
may lead to multiple sentences for same conduct); United States v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 194, 196 (8th Cir. 1990)
(same); United States v. Nakashian, 820 F.2d 549, 552 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
85. See United States v. Hudgins, 131 F.3d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that evidence is sufficient to
support conviction if rational trier of fact could have found essential elements of crime beyond reasonable doubt);
United States v. Thomas, 120 E3d 564, 569 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Bass, 121 F3d 1218, 1220
(8th Cir. 1997) (same); see also United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding sufficient
evidence to support conspiracy conviction where defendant spoke of others who engaged in fraud, engaged in
countersurveillance activities, and negotiated specifics of intended actions); United States v. Young, 954 F.2d 614,
618 (10th Cir. 1992) (concluding that conspiracy may be found based solely on circumstantial evidence); United
States v. Mack, 837 F.2d 254, 257 (6th Cir. 1988) (stating that in appeal challenging sufficiency of evidence in
conspiracy trial, critical inquiry is whether record evidence can reasonably support finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt).
Where defendant alleges insufficient evidence on appeal, the court will view evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Cooper, 121 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Valenti,
121 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Alejandro, 118 F.3d 1518, 1521 (11 th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Barrett, 933 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Staggs, 881 F.2d 1546, 1550 (10th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Sarault, 840 F.2d 1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1988).
86. See discussion of elements of conspiracies under § 371, supraSection I.A. to H.D.; see also United States
v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that evidence of defendant's role in conspiracy is enough
once defendant's voluntary participation is shown); United States v. Morgano, 39 E3d 1358,1377 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding
that to prove conspiracy, government must demonstrate participatory link between conspiracy and defendant).
87. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 464-65 (1978); see Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640, 644-46 (1946) (stating that non-participation in subsequent acts of conspiracy was not sufficient to
disavow self from conspiracy); United States v. Greenfield, 44 F.3d 1141, 1150 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that unless
conspirator produces affirmative evidence of withdrawal, his participation is presumed to continue until the last
overt act by any of the co-conspirators); United States v. Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 161-62 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding no
withdrawal when defendant refuses to take part in planned robbery); United States v. Nava-Salazar, 30 E3d 788,
799 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining there was no withdrawal when defendant stopped participating in conspiracy due
to arrest); United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 437 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that cessation of active
participation in conspiracy is not enough for withdrawal without act to disavow or defeat conspiracy); United
States v. MMR Corp., 907 E2d 489, 500 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating defendant must show affirmative acts inconsistent
with subject of conspiracy and communicated in manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirator(s) to prove
withdrawal).
The participant does not need to notify every other co-conspirator to make his withdrawal valid. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 463-65.
88. See United States v. Bullis, 77 F.3d 1553, 1562 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that conduct by defendant after
withdrawal is relevant to whether withdrawal is complete and in good faith); United States v. Lash, 937 F2d 1077,
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has been committed, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the
withdrawal. 89 Most circuits place the burden of proof of withdrawal on the
defendant. 90
G. Other Defenses

Failure of the conspiracy to achieve its illegal goal, 91 factual impossibility, 92 and
entrapment 93 are not effective defenses to charges of conspiracy. Incompetence 9 4

1084 (6th Cir. 1991) (determining that once overt act occurs, defendant is liable despite withdrawal); United
States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50, 54 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that withdrawal after agreement and commission of one
or more acts will not defeat conviction).
89. See Nava-Salazar,30 F.3d at 799 (holding that after commission of overt act, withdrawal is relevant only
when coupled with statute of limitations); United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1563 (11 th Cir. 1991) (finding
that participation in conspiracy lasts until conspiracy ends or until defendant withdraws, at which point statute of
limitations begins to run).
90. See United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (declaring that defendant has burden of
proving he affirmatively withdrew from conspiracy); United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 582 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that if defendant completely severs his relationship with enterprise, he has established prima facie
showing of withdrawal); United States v. Starrett, 55 E3d 1525, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1995) (concluding that defendant
has substantial burden of proving that he has taken affirmative steps and made reasonable effort to communicate
withdrawal); United States v. Rossy, 953 F.2d 321, 325 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that defendant has burden of
presenting sufficient evidence of withdrawal to raise issue); United States v. Granados, 962 F2d 767, 772 (8th Cir.
1992) (placing burden on defendant to prove withdrawal); United States v. Powell, 982 E2d 1422, 1435 (10th Cir.
1992) (same); Barsanti, 943 F.2d at 437 (holding that defendant must provide evidence he acted to defeat or to
disavow conspiracy); United States v. Chambers, 944 F2d 1253, 1265 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that defendant must
present evidence of affirmative act for withdrawal); United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 404 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding that individual claiming withdrawal has burden of proof); United States v. James, 609 F2d 36,41 (2d Cir.
1979) (same).
91. See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 694 (1975) (concluding that law of conspiracy permits imposition
of criminal sanction for agreement plus overt act, whether or not crime agreed upon is actually committed);
United States v. Warshawsky, 20 F.3d 204, 208 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that it is not necessary for conspirator to
successfully complete all of the elements of underlying offense to be guilty of conspiracy); United States v. Davis,
960 F.2d 820, 828 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that illegal conspiracy is complete regardless of whether agreed-upon
crime is consummated); United States v. Jones, 839 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Petit,
841 F.2d 1546, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1988) (stating that failure to carry out conspiracy does not preclude finding that
conspiracy existed).
92. See United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477,480-81 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that factual impossibility is
no defense to conspiracy charge); United States v. Medina-Garcia, 918 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding conspiracy
offense complete even though factually impossible because certain acts were to be carried out by government
agents); United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that factual impossibility is no
defense to conspiracy charge).
93. See United States v. Anderson, 76 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that defendant charged with conspiracy
to possess and distribute cocaine was predisposed to commit charged crime and thus not entitled to entrapment
defense); United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1468 (8th Cir. 1994) (determining no entrapment existed where
defendant originated idea and no inducements were offered by government); United States v. Toro, 840 F2d 1221,
1231 (5th Cir. 1988) (concluding that defendant charged with conspiracy to import cocaine was predisposed to
commit charged crime and thus not entitled to entrapment defense).
94. Under the Insanity Defense Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994), in a conspiracy to kidnap, defendant has
the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he was insane and must meet the statute's
two-prong test that (1) he suffered from severe mental disease or defect at time of the crime and (2) that such
defect prevented him from appreciating the nature and quality of his acts. United States v. Knott, 894 F.2d 1119,
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and coercion, 95 however, are potentially successful defenses.
IV. Co-CONSPIRATOR HEARSAY RULE

Given the nature of the crime, most conspiracy trials will necessarily include
testimony by co-conspirators. 96 For this reason, this section briefly discusses the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Part A addresses evidentiary issues,
and Part B reviews Sixth Amendment concerns.
A. Evidentiary Issues

Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a "statement is not
hearsay if... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is... a statement by a
co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 97
To admit a co-conspirator's statement into evidence under Rule 801, the trial judge
must determine by a preponderance of the evidence 98 that: (1) a conspiracy
existed; (2) the defendant and declarant were involved in the conspiracy; and (3)
the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 99
1121 (9th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Phillips, 630 F.2d 1138, 1146-47(6th Cir, 1980) (stating that when
only other alleged conspirator was insane, defendant could not be convicted because insane person lacked
capacity to enter into agreement).
95. Compare United States v. Neal, 990 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1993) (finding that coercion exists if fear is
well-grounded and defendant cannot avoid threatened harm) and United States v. Becerra, 992 F.2d 960, 964 (9th
Cir. 1993) (determining that coercion occurs when there is imminent threat, a fear that threat will be carried out,
and no opportunity to escape) with United States v. Logan, 49 F.3d 352, 359 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that
defendant failed to prove coercion defense because he did not establish that he had well grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily injury if he did not continue to participate in conspiracy) and United States v. Podlog, 35
F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that in order to establish coercion defense, defendant must show that
necessary threatened force was present at time of his agreement to participate in conspiracy) and United States v.
Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 588 (7th Cir. 1991) (declaring that defendant failed to offer evidence that he had no
reasonable way of escaping injury or death to himself or his family).
96. See United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545,558 (5th Cir. 1996) (relying on quantity calculations contained in
PSR's based on co-conspirator testimony to convict defendant); United States v. Powers, 75 F.3d 335, 340 (7th
Cir. 1996) (allowing government to present testimony from several co-conspirators concerning defendant's
involvement and participation in conspiracy); United States v. McCarthy, 97 E3d 1562, 1570 (8th Cir. 1996)
(permitting co-conspirator to testify that he personally delivered marijuana shipment to defendant); United States
v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 324 (1st Cir. 1995) (letting co-conspirator testify that defendant was member of
conspiracy and accompanied him in drug drop-offs); United States v. Williams, 56 F.3d 63, 63 (4th Cir. 1995)
(allowing co-conspirators to testify concerning defendant's involvement and participation in conspiracy); United
States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1995) (convicting defendant of conspiracy to possess
methamphetamine with intent to distribute based on testimony of co-conspirator); United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d
1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding defendant guilty of conspiracy based on testimony of co-conspirators
confirming his involvement and participation).
97. FED. R. Evto. 801(d)(2)(E) [hereinafter "Rule 801" in notes]; see also Boudjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 183 (1987) (stating that co-conspirator exception to hearsay rule is "steeped in our jurisprudence").
98. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing standard of proof necessary for determination of
admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay statements).
99. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175; United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v.
Rivera, 22 F.3d 430,435 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Carter, 14 F3d 1150, 1155 (6th Cir. 1994); United States
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When weighing the evidence to determine the admissibility of a co-conspirator's
statement, a court may look at the content of the statement itself but must also
consider independent evidence. 1' ° Courts should examine "the circumstances
surrounding the statement, such as the identity of the speaker, the context in which the
statement was made, or evidence corroborating the contents of the statement. "'0 '
In determining whether a conspiracy existed for admissibility purposes, courts
are not limited solely to consideration of the crimes charged. Out-of-court
statements by co-conspirators may be admissible under Rule 801 even if the
defendant is not charged formally with conspiracy in the indictment. 0 2z However,
when conspiracy is not charged, judges are more likely to admit a co-conspirator's
statement if the conspiracy is closely related to the crime with which the defendant
is charged.'

3

v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Mahkimetas, 991 F.2d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Local 560,974 F.2d 315,337 (3d Cir.
1992); United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1255 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fragoso, 978 F.2d 896, 899
(5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Thompson, 976 F.2d
666, 670 (1 1th Cir. 1992); United States v. Carper, 942 F.2d 1298,1301 (8th Cir. 1991).
FED. R. EVID. 104(a) states: "Preliminary questions concerning ... the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound
by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges." FED. R. EVID. 104(a). As with other questions of
admissibility, Rule 104 requires a threshold determination of admissibility before applying Rule 801. Such
determinations are left to the discretion of the trial judge. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
100. As of December 1, 1997, Rule 801 (d)(2) reads in pertinent part: "The contents of the statement shall be
considered but are not alone sufficient to establish.., the existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein
of the declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered." FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). This amendment
addresses the question left open by Bourjaily--whetherusing co-conspirator statements alone would be enough to
establish admissibility. Amendments to the FederalRules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 712 (1997).
To the extent that they have dealt with the question, the majority of circuit courts have held that some evidence
in addition to the hearsay statements is required. See United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that there must be independent evidence of conspiracy apart from the statement); United States v. Tellier,
83 F.3d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding hearsay statement inadmissible without independent corroborative
evidence of defendant's participation in conspiracy); United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1239 (7th Cir.
1996) (requiring that some evidence, independent of statements, exist to corroborate conspiracy's existence);
United States v. Lopez-Guitierrez, 83 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that independent evidence is
required, but it need not be substantial); United States v. Clark, 18 F3d 1337, 1341 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
relying solely on hearsay statement was not sufficient); Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1182 (holding that co-conspirator's
statement, standing alone, was insufficient to meet preponderance standard of Rule 801); United States v. Silverman, 861
F.2d 571,578 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). But see United States v. Neal, 78 F.3d 901,905 (4th Cir. 1996) (declaring that court
has not yet determined when independent evidence of conspiracy is required); United States v. Meggers, 912 F.2d 246,
248 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that out of court statement is admissible if on independent aid the court is satisfied
that, more likely than not, statement was made during course of and in furtherance of conspiracy).
101. Amendments to the FederalRules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. at 717.
102. See United States v. Godinez, 110 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that government need not even
charge a conspiracy in order for co-conspirator statement to be admitted); United States v. Rivera, 68 F.3d 5, 7 (1 st
Cir. 1995) (same); Carter, 14 F.3d at 1155 (same); United States v. Blankenship, 954 F.2d 1224, 1230 (6th Cir.
1992) (same); United States v. Washington, 952 F.2d 1402, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); United States v.
Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 962 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Helmel, 769 F.2d 1306, 1313 (8th
Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Cawley, 630 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); United States v. Trowery,
542 F.2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1976) (same).
103. See United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 194 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that conspiracy must be "factually
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To satisfy the second prong of the admissibility requirement, the declarant and
the defendant must both be found to have been members of the conspiracy."0 4
Once this determination has been made, any witness can recount the statement,
regardless of whether or not the statement was originally made to a conspiracy
member.105
The determination of whether a proffered statement by a co-conspirator is

admissible as a statement made during the course of and in furtherance of the
conspiracy depends upon the particular facts of each case.10 6 In every case the trial
court must first certify that the statement was made during the existence of the
conspiracy.'" 7 Second, it must determine if the statement was made in furtherance

of the conspiracy. Any statement by a co-conspirator which promotes the main
objectives of the conspiracy is considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy
and is admissible,10 8 Courts have typically accepted that the defendant "[takes] the
conspiracy as he [finds] it."'°9 Therefore, statements made by co-conspirators
intertwined" with offense with which defendant is charged); accord United States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 131
(7th Cir. 1981) (same).
104. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (quoting Rule 801).
105. See United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1300 (1 th Cir. 1995) (admitting tape-recorded conversations
because conspiracy existed when statements were made and defendant subsequently joined that conspiracy);
United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1468 (7th Cir. 1994) (declaring recorded conversations concerning drug
dealings admissible as statements of co-conspirators against defendant even though statements were made after
defendant was in jail); United States v. Beal, 940 F.2d 1159, 1161 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding tape recordings of
co-conspirator's conversations admissible even though not all parties in conversations were identified); United
States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1387 (2d Cir. 1986) (admitting recorded telephone conversations when statements
made "plainly" referred to continuing conspiracy); cf United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F2d 1073, 1085 (1st
Cir. 1989) (holding that statement of unidentified individual about another's role in conspiracy would have been
inadmissible if timely objection had been made).
106. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (discussing determination of scope of conspiracy).
107. Generally, the conspiracy ends and the statute of limitations for prosecution of the conspiracy begins once
the main objectives of the conspiracy have been accomplished. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text
(discussing statutes of limitations for enforcement of conspiracy statutes).
108. See United States v. Guyton, 36 F.3d 655. 659 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining that statements intended to
familiarize others with conspiratorial operations are in furtherance of conspiracy); United States v. Blakey, 960
F.2d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (admitting statements which serve to aid in conspiracy as statements made in
furtherance of conspiracy, but not admitting statements which implicate one conspirator for the purpose of
shifting blame from another); United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 945 (2d Cir. 1991) (declaring statements
made to enhance trust and cohesion among conspirators admissible since made in furtherance of conspiracy);
United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1021 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that statement regarding conspiracy's
progress made to solicit assistance is in furtherance of conspiracy and thus admissible); United States v. Lujan,
936 E2d 406, 411 (9th Cir. 199 1) (stating that statements made to encourage continued participation in conspiracy
properly admitted as in furtherance of conspiracy); United States v. Garcia, 893 E2d 188, 190 (8th Cir. 1990)
(finding statement of facts of conspiracy in furtherance when made in order to recruit co-conspirators); United
States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 341 (1st Cir. 1987) (determining statement identifying co-conspirator as source
of cocaine admissible as in furtherance of conspiracy); cf.Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44
(1949) (holding exception does not extend to uncharged defendant's statements made after alleged conspiracy
ended); United States v. Mayes, 917 F.2d 457, 464 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that, to be admissible, statements do
not actually need to further conspiracy but only need to have been intended to promote conspiratorial objectives).
109. United States v. Adamo, 882 F2d 1218, 1230 (7th Cir. 1989) (first alteration in original) (citations
omitted). See also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 778 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that by joining conspiracy
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prior to the time the defendant joined the conspiracy may be admissible against the
defendant."
The statement of a co-conspirator made to an undercover agent before an arrest
is also considered to be in furtherance of the conspiracy, but an admission or
confession made after an arrest is not."' Additionally, casual comments and
narrative descriptions are generally found to be inadmissible hearsay." 2 Furtherconduct are not in furtherance of
more, statements made after the events about past
t1 3
inadmissible.
are
therefore,
and,
the conspiracy
individual effectively adopts prior co-conspirator declarations); United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214 (2d Cir.
1992) (finding that defendant need not have entered conspiracy at its inception in order to incur liability for
unlawful acts of conspiracy committed both before and entry); United States v. Barksdale-Contreras, 972 F.2d
111, 114 (5th Cir. 1992) (determining that one who joins ongoing conspiracy has adopted prior acts and
declarations of conspirators made since formation and in furtherance of conspiracy).
110. United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296, 1301 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (stating that declarations of all members of
conspiracy are admissible against defendant, even if occurring before defendant joined conspiracy); United States
v. Lokey, 945 F2d 825, 835 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Brown, 943 F2d 1246, 1255 (10th Cir. 1991)
(discussing agreement among circuits that co-conspirator hearsay statements are admissible even if made before
defendant joined conspiracy); United States v. Tuchow, 768 E2d 855, 868 (7th Cir. 1985) (determining that
declarations by conspirators made before defendant entered into conspiracy are admissible against defendant);
United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1984) (same).
111. United States v. Ascarrunz, 838 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1988) (declaring that although arrest operates as
withdrawal and statements of arrested co-conspirator cannot be used against other co-conspirators, statements of
unarrested co-conspirator can be introduced against arrested conspirator). The rationale behind this rule is that an
arrest serves as a withdrawal from the conspiracy and ends the individual's participation in it. Compare Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946) (finding post-arrest admission or confession is not in furtherance of
conspiracy) and United States v. Lombard, 72 F.3d 170, 189 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding arrest terminates conspiracy,
but allowing declaration based on other grounds) and United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1425 (8th Cir.
1993) (determining that statements made while declarant is in custody which incriminate co-conspirators lack
"indicia of reliability") and United States v. Magana-Olvera, 917 F.2d 401, 408-09 (9th Cir. 1990) (declaring
statements made while in custody to gain favoritism of police are not in furtherance of conspiracy) with United
States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1563 (lth Cir. 1990) (finding tape-recorded conversation between two
co-conspirators after one had been arrested admissible because there was sufficient evidence to show that
conspiracy was continuing) and United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234, 1240 (4th Cir. 1989)
(determining telephone call between two arrested co-conspirators properly admitted because evidence showed
conspiracy continued).
112. United States v. Heater, 63 F3d 311, 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (declaring "idle chatter" not in furtherance of
conspiracy); United States v. Perez, 989 F.2d 1574, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that statement "in furtherance"
must be more than mere narrative of prior events); United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1991)
(determining "idle chatter" does not advance "normal information flow between co-conspirators"); United
States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 529 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that in order to fulfill "in furtherance" requirement,
statements had to be more than mere conversation and declarant had to intend to further common conspiratorial
objectives); United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86, 95 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding narrative account of one
co-conspirator about another's past activities inadmissible); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 909 (8th Cir.
1985) (concluding that statements that merely inform listener or reader of declarant's activities are not admissible
as statements made in furtherance of conspiracy).
However, the fact that some portions of the statement may have been "idle chatter" may not render the entire
statement inadmissible. See United States v. Schmit, 881 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1989) (determining that fact that
portions of statement were "idle chatter" or casual admissions of culpability did not make denial of motion to
suppress reversible error).
113. See United States v. Gutierrez, 48 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that narrative declarations of
past conduct are not in furtherance of conspiracy); United States v. Mitchell, 31 F3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 1994)
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1. Standardof Proof
The Supreme Court has held that the existence of a conspiracy, the declarant and
defendant's participation in it, and the fact that a hearsay statement was made
during the course of and in furtherance
of the conspiracy need only be proven by a
4
preponderance of the evidence.'"
2. Order of Proof
Although the Supreme Court has defined the quantum of proof necessary for
admission of co-conspirator hearsay,11 5 it has declined to designate an order of
proof for trial courts to follow in determining whether the standard has been
met." 6 Most circuits have held that the trial court may admit a co-conspirator's
statement, subject to the government's eventual proof by a preponderance of the
evidence of the elements required under Rule 801. t 17 Indeed, these circuits have
held that a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury is not necessary and
that, if the government fails to meet its burden of proof during its presentation of
the case, an instruction to the jury to disregard the statement is sufficient to negate
any prejudice to the defendant which may have occurred.118
(declaring post facto descriptions of conspiracy to third parties inadmissible); see also FED. R. EvIo. 801(d)(2)(E)
(establishing co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule).
114. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987) ("The preponderance standard ensures that before
admitting evidence, the court will have found it more likely than not that the technical issues and policy concerns
addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due consideration").
115. Id.
116. Id. at 176 n.l.
117. United States v. Wilson, 102 E3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that order of proof is subject to
discretion of trial judge and admission subject to eventual proof of conspiracy); United States v. GonzalezBalderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1224 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that court may conditionally admit co-conspirator statements
subject to later determination that factual predicates were met); United States v. Tracy, 12 F.3d 1186, 1199 (2d Cir.
1993) (holding that co-conspirator statements may be conditionally admitted subject to later submission of
necessary evidence of prerequisites for admission of statement); United States v. Moss, 9 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir.
1993) (declaring that admission of co-conspirator statement subject to eventual proof of conspiracy); United
States v. Pedigo, 12 F3d 618, 628 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding pre trial hearing unnecessary for submission subject to
eventual acceptable proof; court may declare mistrial or issue limiting instruction to jury if government fails to
link up evidence); United States v. Blevins, 960 F.2d 1252, 1256 (4th Cir. 1992) (concluding no hearing needed
before co-conspirator statements admitted); United States v. Perez, 959 F.2d 164, 167 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating
that trial judge must make determination of admissibility but that it is not always practical to have determination
made first); United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1360 (3d Cir. 1991) (determining that control over order of
proof belongs to trial judge, and admission subject to later connection is acceptable); United States v.Tamez, 941
F2d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that Bourjaily did not mandate a hearing nor require an express finding);
United States v. Van Hemelryck, 945 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that statements may be admitted
subject to proof of requirements during trial); United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1985) (stating
hearing is not mandated).
118. See United States v. Ruiz, 987 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that district court is not required to
conduct pretrial hearing to determine admissibility of co-conspirator statements); Blevins, 960 F.2d at 1256
(same); United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 967 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that pretrial hearing for decision which
is not final is inefficient means of resolving factual issues arising under co-conspirator exception). But cf.United
States v. Lopez-Guiterrez, 83 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that preferred order of proof in
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B. Sixth Amendment Issues

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses at trial." 9 This right is usually protected
through the application of a two-prong test used to determine the admissibility of

hearsay testimony: (1) the declarant is unavailable to testify; and (2) the statement
bears independent "indicia of reliability."' 120 However, the Supreme Court has
abolished this test with respect to determinations of admissibility of co-conspirator
hearsay, holding that the Confrontation Clause requires neither proof of the
12
' nor any independent inquiry into
unavailability of the declarant co-conspirator
12 2
the reliability of the proffered statement.
V.

ENFORCEMENT

If the conspiracy succeeds, the conspirators can be charged, convicted, and

1 23
Part A
sentenced for both the substantive crime(s) and the conspiracy offense.

discusses the vicarious liability of a defendant for acts of her co-conspirators; Part
B analyzes issues raised by joinder and severance of multiple defendants; and Part
C treats the effect on a defendant of the acquittal of other co-conspirators.
determining admissibility is for district court. first to hold hearing outside presence of jury to determine by
preponderance of evidence existence of predicate conspiracy) United States v. Owens, 70 E3d 1118, 1123 (10th
Cir. 1995) (holding that district court must either hold hearing outside presence of jury or provisionally admit
evidence with caveat that it must be linked during trial); United States v. Allison, 908 R2d 1531, 1534 n.2 (IIth
Cir. 1990) (same).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. V1. The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him .....Id.
120. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,65-66 (1980).
121. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1986). The Court held that, unlike other exceptions,
co-conspirator hearsay testimony has evidentiary significance of its own. Conspirators are likely to speak to each
other differently when furthering their illegal goals than when on the witness stand. Thus, the former testimony is
more than a mere substitute for live testimony. Id.
122. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987). The Court reiterated its Roberts holding that an
independent inquiry into reliability is unnecessary when the evidence "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception." Id. at 183 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). The Court further held that the co-conspirator hearsay
rule is such an exception and, thus, no independent inquiry into reliability is needed. Id.
123. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975) (determining that conspiracy and substantive offenses
are separate crimes); United States v. Pinckney, 85 F.3d 4, 8 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that conspiracy is separate
and distinct crime from substantive offense); United States v. Ambers, 85 F.3d 173, 178 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding
that conspiracy is distinct crime from overt acts that support it); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1104
(10th Cir. 1996) (holding that conspiracy charge and substantive charge are separate offenses and that one offense
is not lesser included offense of the other), cert. denied 117 S.Ct. 1699 (1997); United States v. Mothersill, 87
F.3d 1214, 1218 (11 th Cir. 1996) (stating that basic criminal law principles hold that commission of substantive
offense and conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct), cert. denied 117 S. Ct. 531 (1996), 117 S. Ct. 1109
(1997), 117 S.Ct. 1328; United States v. Bennett, 44 E3d 1364, 1375 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that substantive
offense is distinct from conspiracy to commit that or another substantive offense); United States v. Morris, 957
E2d 1391, 1403 (7th Cir. 1992) (determining that conspiracy and completed substantive offense are separate
crimes and may be punished by separate sentences); United States v. Inafuku, 938 F2d 972, 973 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating
that crime of conspiracy is entirely separate from completed substantive offense); cf.supra note 91 and accompanying text
(discussing point that conspiracy does not need to succeed for defendants to be prosecuted for conspiracy).
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A. Vicarious Liability
Under the Pinkerton rule of vicarious liability, conspirators may be held liable
for any foreseeable overt acts committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the
conspiracy.' 24 This rule lessens the government's burden in establishing the
defendant's guilt in the conspiracy.125 Once the existence of a conspiracy is
established, only slight evidence connecting the defendant to the conspiracy is
needed for a conviction.' 26
B. Joinderand Severance
An important question in conspiracy cases is whether co-conspirators should be
tried jointly or separately. Although joint trials create a danger that the fact-finder
' conspiracy charges usually provide a
will transfer guilt among co-conspirators, 27
28
proper basis for joinder. Severance will be granted only if a defendant can make
"a strong showing of prejudice." 129

124. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (explaining Pinkertonrule).
125. For a theory limiting the Pinkerton rule, see United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing due process limitations on Pinkerton doctrine in cases involving attenuated relationships between
conspirator and substantive crime); see also United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 851 n.27 (lth Cir. 1985)
(proposing limitation on vicarious liability by holding liable only those conspirators with actual knowledge of
circumstances of conspiracy or who played more than minor part in conspiracy). However, most circuits have
declined to limit the Pinkerton rule in this manner.
126. United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1553 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Milligan, 17 F.3d 177, 183
(6th Cit. 1994). But see United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1285 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that government must
demonstrate more than "casual transactions" between defendant and conspirators).
The Seventh Circuit has held that "substantial" evidence should be the test rather than "slight" evidence or
"slight" connection. United States v. Durrive, 902 F.2d 1221, 1228-29 (7th Cit. 1990).
127. United States v. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946). See also United States v. Gentry, 839 F.2d 1065,
1071 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing substantial right of co-conspirators not to be tried together for separate offenses
committed by others due to danger of prejudicial transference of guilt); United States v. McVeigh, 169 F.R.D. 362,
370 (D. Colo. 1996) (recognizing that joint trial of defendants presented unacceptable risk of prejudice to both and
granting defendants' motions for severance). There was no danger in Gentry of transference of guilt among
defendants, because evidence concerning other conspirators who had accepted plea bargains was not introduced
at trial. Gentry, 839 F.2d at 1071.
128. United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110,1119 (6th Cir. 1996) (favoring joint trial when offenses are all
"logically related" to conspiracy); United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (showing general
preference for joint trials in conspiracy cases); United States v. Shorter, 54 F.3d 1248, 1258 (7th Cir. 1995)
(granting severance only when specific trial right of defendant would be infringed by joint trial); United States v.
Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 608 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding joint trials highly favored in conspiracy cases); United States v.
Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1323 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that in interest of judicial economy, conspirators should
generally be tried together); United States v. Adkins, 842 F.2d 210, 211 (8th Cir. 1988) (declaring that defendants
charged in same conspiracy or jointly indicted on similar evidence should be tried together).
Joinder is proper under FED.R. CRm. P. 8(b) if the defendants are alleged to have participated in the same series
of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Rule 8(b) requires only that a conspiracy be alleged.
There is no requirement under the Rule that the government provide, at the pleading stage, sufficient evidence to
support joinder. United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1410, 1412 (7th Cir. 1987).
129. The decision to grant a severance is within the discretion of the trial judge. See FED. R. CaIM. P. 14
(requiring showing of prejudice on motion to sever defendants). To make a showing of prejudice on appeal,
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C. Acquittal of Other Co-Conspirators

Traditionally, if co-conspirators are tried together, one conspirator cannot be
convicted under § 371 if all the other conspirators are acquitted.' 30 The First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits
have now departed from this "rule of consistency."'' 31 The Tenth Circuit has
expressed doubt about the continued validity of the rule, but as yet has not
expressly rejected it.132 In these circuits, if the indictment alleges that unknown
persons participated in the conspiracy and the evidence supports their participation, then the named defendant may still be convicted of the conspiracy."'
VI. SENTENCING
Consecutive sentences can be imposed for conspiracy and substantive offense

appellant must show "more than the mere fact that he would have had a better chance for acquittal had he been
tried separately... [t]he appellant must demonstrate that the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence as
it related to separate defendants." Adkins, 842 F.2d at 212; see also Zafiro v.United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538
(1993) (finding antagonistic defenses are not per se prejudicial, thus severance is not required); United States v.
Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1572 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring severance onlyif serious risk that joint trial would prevent
reliable determination of guilt); United States v. DeFranco, 30 F.3d 664, 669-70 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
severance not required when evidence is more damaging against one defendant than against another).
130. United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence was insufficient
to convict defendant since it was insufficient to convict co-conspirator of conspiracy); United States v. Sachs, 801
F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1986) (describing traditional rule as "rule of consistency").
131. United States v. Rogers, 121 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that acquittal of one co-conspirator did
not establish that evidence was insufficient to support defendant's conspiracy conviction); United States v.
Anderson, 76 F3d 685, 688-89 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that individual's conviction may stand despite acquittal of
other alleged co-conspirators); United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d 473, 477 (lth Cir. 1996) (declaring that
conspiracy conviction can stand even if other alleged co-conspirators are unidentified); United States v. Acosta,
17 F.3d 538, 545 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding the acquittal of other co-conspirators not grounds for reversal); United
States v. Hughes Aircraft, 20 F.3d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that conviction of co-conspirator is valid even
when others are acquitted); United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 878 (5th Cir. 1992) (declaring acquittal
of all other defendants not determinative of remaining conspirator's acquittal); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d
37, 40 (4th Cir. 1990) (requiring no acquittal where other defendant acquitted, regardless of inconsistency of
verdict); United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (declining to adopt rule of consistency).
Furthermore, if conspirators are tried separately, the acquittal of all co-conspirators does not require the
acquittal of the last-tried defendant. Cortis v. Kenney, 995 F.2d 838, 840-41 (8th Cir. 1993) (declaring that
separate trials exception to rule of consistency applies in trials with and without a jury); United States v. Senibaldi,
959 F.2d 1131, 1135 (1st Cir. 1992) (stating "rule of consistency" does not apply in separate trials); Sachs, 801
F.2d at 845 (allowing inconsistent verdicts because different juries may hear different evidence in separate trials);
United States v. Roark, 753 F.2d 991,995 (11th Cir. 1985) (same).
132. United States v. Abbott Washroom Sys., 49 F.3d 619, 623 (10th Cir. 1995) (declining to decide whether
limited rule of consistency remains valid).
133. United States v. Howard, 966 F.2d 1362, 1364 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that if existence of unindicted
co-conspirators is proven, then defendant can be convicted); United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 810 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that conviction of defendant can stand even when other named co-conspirators are acquitted if
unnamed co-conspirators proven to exist); cf.Sachs, 801 F.2d at 845 (declaring that conviction of defendant may
stand if charges are never brought against other alleged co-conspirator, or if alleged co-conspirator has not yet
been tried; dismissal of charges against defendant not required).
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convictions. 3 4 The Supreme Court "has even held that the conspiracy
can be
35
1
purpose."
its
of
accomplishment
the
than
harshly
punished more
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), which provide specific
rules governing the sentencing ranges for a conspiracy conviction, contain specific
offense guideline provisions applicable to conspiracies to commit particular

offenses.' 36 Additionally, there is a general catch-all provision
applicable to all
1 37
provision.
offense
specific
a
conspiracies not covered by
For the conspiracy conviction, the base offense level of the underlying offense is
decreased by three levels, unless defendant completed all acts necessary for the
underlying offense. 138 If the conspiracy participants have completed, or were
about to complete, but for apprehension or interruption of some similar event
beyond their control, the intended offense, a slightly different formulation applies. 139
If the defendant is convicted on a single conspiracy count to commit more than
one substantive offense, each offense will be analyzed as a separate count of
conspiracy. 140 Also taken into consideration are adjustments from the specific
134. lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777-78 (1975) (stating it is well settled that law of conspiracy
serves ends different from those served by criminal prohibitions of substantive offense and that consecutive
sentences may be imposed); see also United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1566 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that
defendant could receive consecutive sentences on RICO and conspiracy counts); United States v. Walker, 920
F2d 513, 519 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding imposition of consecutive sentences for tax evasion and conspiracy);
United States v. Wade, 788 F.2d 722, 722 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (upholding consecutive sentences for conspiracy to
possess marijuana with intent to distribute and for accompanying substantive offense).
135. lannelli, 420 U.S. at 778. But see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946)("[A] single
conspiracy, charged under general conspiracy statute, however diverse its objects may be, violates but a single
statute and no greater penalty than the maximum provided for one conspiracy may be imposed").
136. See U.S. SENTENc NG GUIDELUINS MANUAL App. A (1998) (indexing the guidelines applicable to each
statutory violation) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
137. U.S.S.G. § 2X1.I (1998) (Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy); U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 (1998) (listing other
offenses).
138. U.S.S.G. § 2Xl.1(b)(2) (1998). See United States v. Medina, 74 F.3d 413,417 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that
focus is on defendant's conduct in determining intended offense, not on probability that conspiracy would have
achieved success); United States v. Depew, 932 F.2d 324, 330 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that intended offense
conduct carries some weight as actual conduct but that Guidelines authorize reduction of three levels where all
acts necessary to complete conspiracy have not occurred).
139. U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(2) (1998). If multiple counts of conspiracy that are not closely related are involved,
then the inquiry of which standard to employ must be determined separately for each count. U.S.S.G.
§ 2X 1.1 (b)(2) cmt.4 (1998). In such a case, the offense level of the conspiracy charge is the greater of: the offense
level of the substantive charge minus three, under § 2X 1.1 (b)(2), or the offense level of the offense for which the
necessary acts were completed or nearly completed. Id. See United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir.
1996) (pointing out that Guidelines allowed sentencing court to take into consideration conduct that neither was
formally charged nor was element of offense of which defendant was convicted); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d
819, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (determining that, in tax evasion conspiracy, district court's refusal to grant sentencing
reduction was not clearly erroneous where record indicated that offense would have been completed but for
resignation of one conspirator).
140. U.S.S.G. § IBI.2(d) (1998). For example, if the defendant conspired to commit three robberies, there
would be three separate counts of conspiracy for sentencing purposes (even if there was only one actual
conspiracy conviction involved). U.S.S.G. § 1B 1.2 cmt.4 (1998). However, if the object offenses specified in the
single conspiracy count can be grouped under § 3D1.2(d) (for example, a conspiracy to steal three government
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offense guideline "for any intended offense conduct that can be established with
reasonable certainty."' 4 1 Under this analysis, whether or not the defendant
14 2
qualifies as a "minor participant" or a "minimal participant" becomes relevant.

The Guidelines recognize the concept of vicarious liability through the inclusion
of the phrase "conduct for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable." 143 Thus, for purposes of establishing the offense level for sentencing, acts of
co-conspirators that are reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and done in

furtherance of the conspiracy are attributable to the defendant.
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checks), then it is not necessary to count each of these as a separate conspiracy charge when sentencing. U.S.S.G.
§ LB 1.2 cmt.5 (1998); see United States v. Griffith, 85 F.3d 284, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding offense counts to
be appropriately grouped where offenses involved same harm).
141. U.S.S.G § 2Xl.l(a) (1998). The only specific offense characteristics that apply are those that are
determined to have been specifically intended or actually occurred; speculative specific offense characteristics are
not applicable. U.S.S.G. § 2XI.1 cmt.2 (1998).
142. U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.2 (1998). A minimal participant is one who is plainly among the least culpable of those involved
in the conduct of the group. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt.l (1998). A minor participant is less culpable than most other
participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt.3 (1998). The defendant's lack of
knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role
as a minimal participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmtLI (1998); see also Rosier v. United States Parole Comm'n, 109 F3d 212,
214 (5th Cir. 1997) (determining that defendant did not amount to "minimal" participant because of his role in
transporting drugs); United States v. Ruelas, 106 F3d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that touchstone of
determining whether defendant is entitled to downward adjustment as minimal or minor participant is relative culpability);
United States v. Brazel, 102 E3d 1120, J162 (1 th Cir. 1997) (holding that girlfriend of drug dealer was not entitled to
minimal participant adjustment given her role as co-conspirator); United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1263 (D.C. Cir
1996) (affirning trial court's ruling that defendant qualified as a minor not a minimal participant because he participated in
drug-related transactions); United States v. Royal, 100 E3d 1019, 1030 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that defendants are not
automatically entitled to downward adjustment in offense level for minor or minimal participation in offense); United
States v. McGrady, 97 F3d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 1996) (concluding that since defendant was essential to commission of
crimes, he did not qualify as minor or minimal participant); United States v. Cochran, 14 F.3d 1128, 1131 (6th Cir. 1994)
(describing "minimal participant" as one-time participant loading drugs for large drug cartel); United States v. Bolin, 35
F3d 306, 310 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining downward adjustment in sentencing properly denied where defendant was less
culpable than other participants but played integral role in counterfeiting scheme).
A sentence may be enhanced if the defendant played a managerial or supervisory role in the conspiracy.
U.S.S.G. § 3Bl.1 (1998). See United States v. Gavina, 116 F.3d 1498, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that
defendant's role in linking together cocaine supplier and his confederates in drug supply network warranted
addition of two points to his offense level); United States v. Cruz, 120, F3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
defendant's offense level was properly increased for aggravated role as manager of drug conspiracy); United
States v. Thomas, 120 F.3d 564, 574 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir.
1995) (concluding that upward adjustment for leadership role was justified where defendant exercised control
over other participants in commission of crime); United States v. Dillard, 43 F.3d 299, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1994)
(enhancing sentence for managerial role in conspiracy where defendant recruited accomplices and had decisionmaking position in operation).
143. U.S.S.G. § IB1.3(a)(l) & cmt.2 (1998). See United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1076-77 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding that relevant conduct under Guidelines includes all reasonably foreseeable acts of others in
furtherance of conspiracy, but that reasonable foreseeability of all drug sales does not automatically follow from
membership in conspiracy); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (concluding that
liability under Guidelines follows from well-settled principles of conspiracy law).

